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ABSTRACT 
 
Willingness to support public programs for risk management often depends on individual 
subjective risk perceptions in the face of uncertain science. As part of a larger study concerning 
climate change, we explore individual updated subjective risks as a function of individual priors, 
the nature of external information, and individual attributes. We examine several rival 
hypotheses about how subjective risks change in the face of new information (Bayesian 
updating, alarmist learning, and ambiguity aversion).  The source and nature of external 
information, as well as its collective ambiguity, can have varying effects across the population, 
in terms of both expectations and uncertainty.   
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Updating Subjective Risks in the Presence of Conflicting Information:  
An Application to Climate Change 
 
 
 When a new social problem emerges, peoples preference orderings over possible 
policy solutions are initially uncertain and subject to frequent updating.  For example, consider 
the evolving policy challenges posed by things like genetically modified organisms, human 
cloning, the Strategic Defense Initiative, biological weapons, species extinctions, the human 
carcinogenicity of new (or sometimes, old) substances, or the long-term storage of nuclear 
wastes.   Information on the causes and/or potential consequences of these problems is often 
incomplete and contradictory. Over time, new and sometimes competing information emerges 
from various sources in ways that can change peoples evaluations of the problem and 
therefore the appropriateness of different public policy responses.  
 The updating of subjective risks is also important to many private choices.  
Government information programs are increasingly being implemented as partial remedies for 
market failure, since imperfect information is one of a number of excuses for such failures.1 
But government information programs compete for the consumers attention with other 
sources of information.2  The success of information programs, in terms of their effects on 
individual choices, thus also hinges on the processes whereby individuals update subjective 
risks. 3 
  In this paper, we use a particular example of a public policy problem--climate change 
risks.  We focus on estimating the weights that individuals place on the opinions of 
government scientists and environmental groups as they update their subjective beliefs about 
the nature of this problem.  We test four rival hypotheses about how people update their 
beliefs in the face of new and sometimes conflicting information. These hypotheses include (1) 
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strict Bayesian updating, (2) alarmist learning, (3) ambiguity aversion, and (4) cross-sectional 
homogeneity/heterogeneity in the updating process.  
 For the climate change example, this research can be viewed as a precursor to 
understanding how willingness to pay to prevent climate change will evolve over time.4  How 
do people combine alternative information about future climate prospects, in terms of both 
expectation and uncertainty, based on evidence or conclusions that they pick up from different 
sources? Individuals will have different views about the credibility of these different sources, 
and sources deemed more-credible can be expected to have a greater influence.  
 In this paper, we focus on estimating the weights that individuals place on the opinions 
of government scientists and environmental groups in forming their opinions about future 
climate conditions in the absence of mitigation. The task is thus narrowly delineated.5  The 
quasi-experimental exercise we examine here is a stylized version of what goes on in the real 
world, but it is sufficient to explore richer models than have previously been examined for the 
process whereby individuals update their priors in response to external information.  Our key 
results are demonstrated for a convenience sample, so further research is clearly warranted.  
Nevertheless, the present data produce some very clear findings concerning our four main 
hypotheses:  people do not use strict Bayesian updating, they are not, on average, alarmist 
learners, but there is considerable ambiguity aversion and systematic heterogeneity in the 
manner in which different people respond to multiple alternative sources of climate 
information.   
 Section 1 provides a very simple model in the context of the climate change example 
and elaborates upon the four hypotheses. Section 2 describes the relevant portions of a survey 
instrument that was administered to a convenience sample of college students, resulting in a 
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data set that allows some basic models, and their generalizations with heterogeneity, to be 
evaluated.  Section 3 discusses the empirical results based on these data, which lead to two 
plausible models, each consisting of a system of nonlinear simultaneous equations with a 
variety of parameter restrictions, and Section 4 concludes with some speculation about how 
these new insights might be used. 
 
1. Updating Subjective Distributions based on Outside Information 
The cognitive process of updating subjective risks is a topic of intellectual merit on its 
own.  However, we wish to emphasize in this paper that the relevant endpoint will typically 
concern how this updated risk information will alter public opinion about policies with respect 
to risk mitigation.   
 There has been substantial policy interest in recent years in the topic of risk 
communication (e.g. Davies et al., 1987).  This literature focuses on the best way to convey to 
individuals the true objective magnitudes of risks.6 There has been less attention, however, to 
the problem of eliciting subjective probabilities.  Reliable elicitation of (at least) the means 
and variances of the subjective probability distributions for climate chance consequences will 
be crucial to any analysis of societys willingness to incur the costs of climate change 
mitigation.7 
When risk perceptions feed into the demands for alternative public policies, non-
market valuation via stated preference survey methods is often necessary. The information 
effects literature, within the broader literature on non-market valuation via survey methods, 
has concentrated on the extent to which information provided by the survey instrument affects 
the resultant estimates of willingness to pay (WTP) for non-market public goods (e.g. 
Blomquist and Whitehead (1998), Bohara et al. (1998), Munro and Hanley (1999), Hoehn and 
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Randall (2002)).  One of the key questions has concerned how much information should be 
provided to respondents in stated preference surveys.  There must be enough detail to satisfy 
the recommendation of full and unbiased information (Arrow et al. 1993), but not so much 
as to create information overload and compromise survey response rates or respondent 
patience or comprehension (Bergstrom and Stoll, 1990, DeShazo and Fermo, 2002).   
For most survey-based experiments in this vein, the strategy has been to vary the 
amount of information provided to respondents and then assess the effect of this information 
directly on WTP.  It seems useful to decompose this overall effect into two constituent effects. 
 New information first leads the individual to modify, to a greater or lesser extent, their prior 
impressions of the non-market public good for which they are being asked to pay.  
Subsequently, this change in perception affects their WTP for the good.   In this paper, we 
attempt to provide greater resolution concerning the first of these two processes. 
How do individuals update their prior subjective distributions for measures of future 
environmental quality as new information becomes available from sources that may have 
different levels of credibility in the mind of the individual?  Hoehn and Randall (2002) devise 
a survey experiment that involves treating respondents with sequentially administered doses 
of information about each of a number of different dimensions of a natural resource injury.  At 
each step, post-treatment injury perception is a weighted sum of prior information and the new 
information contained in an information treatment, but these weights are not heterogeneous 
across individuals.  The emphasis in the Hoehn-Randall model is that one can allow 
heterogeneous baseline information to generate heterogeneous perceptions of resource injuries 
even though the informational treatment is the same.  This is consistent with the observation in 
Cameron and Englin (1997) that survey-provided information is only incremental, added to 
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whatever information survey subjects may have previously acquired on their own. 
 In this paper, the experimental design involves treating respondents with different 
information.  We focus on the problem of climate change policy and consider estimates of 
future annual average temperatures, t  (simplifying greatly by treating climate change as a one-
dimensional problem, which it is not).  Suppose individuals begin with a prior distribution for 
future climate in their region, ( )f t , with expected value  and variance V t . We wish to 
model explicitly the data-generating process that yields each individual's revised values of 
 and V  associated with their revised distribution 
[ ]oE t
*(
[ ]o
*[ ]E t *[ ]t )f t after they have been exposed 
to differing types of climate information attributed to different sources.  These sources are 
characterized broadly as government scientists and environmental groups. 
 Our survey instrument elicits subjective prior distributions for future average 
temperatures, provides all of the "outside" information (using a randomized design), and then 
elicits revised subjective distributions, so it is relatively simple to model the updating process.8 
 What hypotheses can be tested using these data?  First, formal Bayesian updating strategies 
can be evaluated by testing strict Bayesian updating formulas for mean and precision against 
some more general specifications.     
 Second, it is appropriate to assess whether there is any evidence of alarmist learning. 
 Viscusi and Magat (1992) describe the possibility that individuals may overreact to 
information they receive.  For what they term an alarmist learner, the relative informational 
weights on the two external sources of information are super-additive, meaning they would 
exceed one either individually or collectively.  The discussion in this paper focuses on 
estimating the weights that individuals place on the opinions of government scientists and 
environmental groups.  It will be possible to assess whether either of these weights is greater 
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than one, or whether their sum exceeds unity. 
 Third, it is possible to adapt an idea of Viscusi and Magat (1992) to allow respondents' 
attentiveness to external information to be affected by the extent of the disparity among the 
sources of external information to which they are exposed.9  This disparity might be crudely 
summarized as the difference between the highest and lowest values (range, R) for each 
characteristic of the distribution of future average annual temperatures attributed to the 
different external information sources.  If this range is small, the individual may place 
relatively greater trust in all outside sources than in his or her own prior subjective 
distributions.  If the range is large, the respondent may retreat to place relatively greater 
weight on his or her own judgment.  In the survey employed for this analysis, range R  in the 
outside opinions about  is just another attribute of the array of external distributional 
characteristics that were part of the experimental design of the survey instrument.  
t
R  is 
therefore an exogenous variable.10    
 To determine whether the degree of ambiguity in the available external information has 
any systematic effect on the updating process, one would test the hypothesis that the 
coefficient(s) on the ambiguity term(s) is (are jointly) equal to zero.  In a more elaborate 
model, where there might be a much larger number of outside information sources, the 
standard error of means across all outside sources might be a more useful measure of the 
degree of ambiguity.  Whatever measure is used, it is associated only with the normalized 
weight on the individual's own prior subjective distribution on environmental quality.  
Whatever functional form is used to capture the ambiguity effect, it plays the same role  
to shift the weight away from outside sources and towards the individual's prior subjective 
distribution. 
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2.  Data: Survey and Sample  
 The survey upon which this research is based was implemented, in part, as an extensive 
pre-test and pilot survey for a much larger study that addresses public support for a range of 
different climate change mitigation policies with different features. The later study, however, 
does not pose the same questions in the same way.11  The questions and answers analyzed here 
are unique to this pilot survey. 
 After two rounds of pretests, a pencil-and-paper questionnaire was distributed to 
Summer Session undergraduate economics classes.  Students received a five-minute 
introduction to the survey during the lecture period and were requested to return the completed 
survey by the next lecture.12   A second round of sampling was conducted in two classes 
during the Fall quarter of the same year, and a third round of sampling, using similar classes, 
took place in the Fall of the next year.  Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the 608 subjects 
in the estimating sample.   
 For empirical assessment of risk perception in the context of climate change, 
information about subjective uncertainty over the entire trajectory of the full array of climate 
change consequences would be desirable.  However, such trajectories are very difficult to 
elicit, so we begin with just a particular snapshot:  annual average temperature during a 
future decade.   
 Prior to the first elicitation of subjective future average temperature forecasts on the 
survey, actual historical annual data were provided for the weather station nearest the 
respondent.  The data were depicted in the form of a scatter graph with annual average 
temperatures on the vertical axis (rounded to the nearest whole degree Fahrenheit) and years 
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on the horizontal axis.  A stylized thermometer, labeled actual (1987-1996) was positioned 
to the immediate right of this graph and the marginal distribution of average temperatures was 
shown as a horizontal histogram summarizing the variation in average annual temperatures 
over this decade.  A second thermometer, labeled average actual (1987-1996) displayed an 
arrow showing the mean annual average temperature over this time interval (63.5 degrees).  
This incremental display strategy is intended to help the respondent understand that 
comparable summary information (annual averages, averaged over a decade) is being sought 
for a future decade.  It also ensures that the respondent will be making his or her forecast for 
the expected value and dispersion of future mean temperatures based on valid current data.   
 On the facing page of the survey instrument, we then elicited information on the mean 
and dispersion of the individual's prior subjective distribution for future environmental quality. 
As an anchoring device, the thermometer showing the historical mean annual average 
temperature was re-displayed each time any temperature information was elicited or provided.  
 To elicit a subjective distribution for future annual average temperatures, the survey 
used a pair of thermometer scales, labeled best guess future (2011-2020) and high, low 
guesses future (2011-2020).  Respondents were instructed to use arrows by each 
thermometer to convey information about expected value and uncertainty about annual 
average temperatures in their region in the decade of 2011-2020.  Expected values seem 
relatively easy to elicit.  It is more difficult to ask respondents to convey information on 
variances.  For dispersion measures, we elected to ask individuals for their high guess and 
low guess (meaning that there is only a 5% chance that the average temperature will be outside 
this interval).  We then interpret this range as roughly four standard deviations, squaring 0.25 
times this amount to yield a variance approximation.  Of course, this strategy ignores any 
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asymmetry in this distribution. 
 Once these prior distributions have been established, the respondent is presented with 
information describing the distributions of future average temperatures (purportedly) 
forecasted by government scientists and by environmental groups.  This was done overleaf in 
the survey instrument, and after the respondent had broken a seal that inhibited access to the 
next (centerfold) page of the survey booklet.13  The reference data thermometer was presented 
again, but this time there were two additional pairs of thermometers.  For each of  
Government Scientists and Environmental Groups, we depict separate thermometers for 
most likely future (2011-2020) and high; low future (2011-2020) guesses.14   
 Respondents appeared to have no difficulty understanding what was required of them. 
A key objective of the analysis, of course, is to discriminate among the effects of different 
external information sources on the respondent's distributional updating process.  The design 
of the different survey versions ensures that there is orthogonal variation across respondents in 
these purported external forecasts.  (See the Appendix.) 
 On a facing page, after viewing the external information on future climate, respondents 
are invited to use a final pair of thermometers to update their priors on the distribution of 
future annual average temperatures, giving both a new expected value and a new 95% range 
(which we again convert to a variance, invoking the same strong distributional assumptions).   
 Each temperature scale in the survey was continuous, and one of the tasks during data 
entry was to impute as closely as possible, to one decimal place on the temperature scale, the 
position of the point of each arrow drawn by each respondent.  The analysis in this paper 
involves the information on the four pairs of temperature scales:  the subjective prior 
distribution entered by the respondent, the stylized external information about future 
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temperature distributions depicted by that particular survey variant for Government 
Scientists and for Environmental Groups (there were sixteen unique combinations), and the 
updated subjective posterior distribution entered by the respondent.  It is this last updated 
distribution that this research seeks to explain, using the other three distributions and an array 
of sociodemographic and attitudinal variables.  Summary statistics for the estimating sample 
are presented in Table 1. 
 
3.  Empirical Findings 
 How do survey respondents process the information attributed to government scientists 
and environmental groups when they are given the opportunity to update their own opinions in 
the light of this additional information?  One possibility is that they may be Bayesians.  If so, 
their own subjective prior distribution and different pieces of external information are all 
ingredients in the formulation of an updated distribution, but a very precise set of weights is 
involved.  These weights reflect the uncertainty surrounding each constituent piece of 
information.  In the presence of two additional sources of information about mean and variance 
(precision) of a distribution, the usual textbook Bayesian formulas for the case of one 
additional source appear to generalize straightforwardly:  the posterior mean should be a 
precision-weighted average of the component means, and the posterior precision should be the 
sum of the component precisions.15  
 In order to simplify the notation, define the sum of precisions: 
 1 1( [ ] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ ] )o gD V t V t V t
1
e
− −= + + −  (1) 
 
where the subscript o on each variance term stands for own, the subscript g stands for 
government scientists, and the subscript e stands for environmental groups.  Similar 
  
  11
subscripting will modify expectations and other descriptors of the different distributions of 
future temperatures.  It seems appropriate to test whether the updating process could be 
Bayesian, against the alternative that it is more general, by specifying the following two 
regression models, one for the posterior expected value, and one for the posterior precision: 
 
11 1
*
0 1 2 3
( [ ] ) [ ]( [ ] ) [ ] ( [ ] ) [ ][ ] g go o e e E
V t E tV t E t V t E tE t
D D D
α α α α
−− −
= + + + +ε
P
 (2) 
 
 
 * 1 1 1 10 1 2 3[ ] ( [ ] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ ] )o g eV t V t V t V tβ β β β
− − −= + + + +ε−  (3) 
 
 
Estimating these two models, and testing the joint hypothesis that 0 0α =  and 1 2 3 1α α α= = =  
for the  model and the joint hypothesis that *[ ]E t 0 0β =  and 1 2 3 1β β β= = =  for the V t
* 1[ ]−  
model (either separately, or jointly) would constitute a rough test of whether the updating 
process could indeed be strictly Bayesian. 
 The first and third columns in Table 2 shows the results for unrestricted estimation of 
the generalized Bayesian models in equations (2) and (3), and the second and fourth 
columns show analogous estimates when the intercepts are constrained to zero.  While the 
unrestricted point estimates of the slope parameters appear close to unity in the case of  
(for equation (2)), F-tests of the restriction that all slopes are simultaneously one soundly 
reject that hypothesis.  (The P-values for these F-tests are essentially zero for the  
equation.)  For V t  (equation(3)), the point estimates of the individual slopes are 
markedly different from one, and the null hypothesis of jointly unitary slopes is again rejected 
conclusively.  These individuals are not behaving like strict Bayesians. 
*[ ]E t
*[ ]E t
*[ ]−1
 A competing model might be that respondents' updated expected values  and *[ ]E t
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updated variances V  are determined more simply.  Instead of the more elaborate general 
linear function of the precision-weighted expectations in equation (2), used for testing 
Bayesian updating, consider the hypothesis that  is simply a linear function of , 
*[ ]t
*[ ]E t [ ]oE t
[ ]gE t , and : [ ]eE t
'
2 [E tα α+
'
2 [ ]V tβ β+
 ' ' '0 1 3*[ ] [ ] ] [ ]o g eE t E t E tα α= + + +ε  (4) 
'
E
 
One can test the two competing non-nested hypotheses in equations (2) and (4)with a Cox 
test and a Davidson-MacKinnon J-test. These tests can be applied for specifications with and 
without intercepts.  For specifications of  with and without intercept terms, the Cox tests 
and the J-tests reject both the model in equation (2) and that in equation (4).    
*[ ]E t
 For dispersion, analogous Cox and J-tests are not appropriate.  Again, the competing 
ad hoc model should probably consist of a simple linear relationship between V and the 
constituent variances, V t , 
*[ ]t
[ ]o [ ]gV t , and V t : [ ]e
 * ' ' '0 1 3[ ] [ ] [ ]o g eV t V t V tβ β= + + +ε  (5) 
'
V
 
The dependent variable in the generalized Bayesian specification in equation (3), however, is 
the posterior precision, not the posterior variance (unless nonlinear-in-parameters models are 
broached) so the competing variance specifications are not as amenable to Cox or J-tests.  
 This preliminary evidence seems to suggest quite clearly, however, that the strict 
Bayesian formulation is probably not appropriate in this context, particularly for the variance.  
The simple linear model appears to dominate even the generalization of the Bayesian 
specification with nonzero intercept and non-unitary slopes.  So it is reasonable to consider 
possible ad hoc specifications more carefully.    
 In Table 3, the first two models we tabulate are for , the respondent's revised *[ ]E t
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subjective average annual temperature.  The first column displays results for the unrestricted 
linear function in equation (4) and the second column shows the slope estimates when the 
intercept in this specification is restricted to zero.  (This intercept restriction can be rejected at 
the 5% level according to the t-test statistic on the intercept in the first model, which does not 
allow for respondent heterogeneity.  In models with heterogeneity, like the ones we will 
ultimately prefer, this restriction is not rejected).  If we impose the intercept restriction in this 
simple model with constant parameters, we cannot reject the further restriction that the sum of 
the slopes is unity.  The individual slope coefficients in both models are all strongly 
statistically significant.   
 The model with the intercept restriction is offered in order to test for the presence of 
Viscusi-Magat "alarmist learning."  With a zero intercept imposed, but the slope parameters 
free to take on whatever values are dictated by the data, the P-value for the F-test statistic for 
the null hypothesis that the sum of the slopes on [ ]gE t  and  is equal to one is 0.377, 
which fails to reject the hypothesis.   The confidence interval for the sum of the slopes on 
[ ]eE t
[ ]gE t
*[ ]E t
 and  includes values both less than and greater than one.  There is no suggestion, 
therefore, that the coefficients on the outside information are greater than one either 
individually, or in sum, so there is no statistical evidence of alarmist learning with respect to 
 in this sample. 
[ ]eE t
 Other preliminary models (not tabulated) explore the hypothesis that the extent of the 
disparity between the two outside sources of information about the  will affect the weight 
applied to , the own-prior.  In an otherwise unrestricted specification, the greater the 
ambiguity in the outside information (the greater the disparity between 
[ ]E t
[ ]oE t
[ ]gE t  and ), the [ ]eE t
  
  14
greater is the weight on the own-expectation, and by a statistically very significant amount.  
Also in these models, the intercept coefficient becomes insignificantly different from zero at 
the 5% level.  For subsequent modeling efforts concerning , based on this accumulated 
evidence, we will be using a model with zero intercept, ambiguity effects, and weights on own 
prior and outside information that sum to unitygeneralized to include systematically varying 
parameters.  This choice is also driven partly by its expedience for the potential application of 
simulating a counterfactual shift to zero weights on specified information sources, while 
preserving the relative weights on the other sources. 
*[ ]E t
 Table 3 also explores some simple linear specifications for the relationship between 
posterior variance V  and the three component variances, as in equation(5).  The 
unrestricted linear specification in the first model shows the intercept to be insignificantly 
different from zero.  The second model restricts the intercept to zero and forces the slopes to 
sum to unity.  This set of two restrictions cannot be rejected.  Additional models (not 
tabulated) reveal that ambiguity effects are also important in ad hoc models to explain 
posterior variance.  When the slope on the own prior variance is allowed to shift with the 
magnitude of the disparity between the two outside sources, the positive slope differential 
bears a t-test statistic in excess of eleven. 
*[ ]t
 Based on these preliminary models, we will be assuming that both expected values and 
variances can be reasonably well approximated by simple weighted averages of the three 
components, provided ambiguity effects are recognized.  These models will be the basis for 
the generalizations to be described next. 
 
3.1.  Two-equation model with homogeneous ambiguity effects 
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 In Table 4, we show the results of employing the available variables capturing 
respondent characteristics as factors that may shift an individual's relative weights on the 
different sources of information about future climate conditions (for both the mean and the 
variance).  The estimates stem from a two-equation simultaneous non-linear least squares 
(NLLS) model that is specified in a manner that ensures that the models display zero intercepts 
and non-negative weights that sum to unity, for both the expectation equation and the variance 
equation.  The basic form of the jointly estimated model is: 
 
1
1
1
*[ ] (1 | [ ] [ ] |)[(1 | [ ] [ ] |) exp( ) exp( )] [ ]
exp( )[(1 | [ ] [ ] |) exp( ) exp( )] [ ]
exp( )[(1 | [ ] [ ] |) exp( ) exp( )] [ ]
E g e E g e g e o
g E g e g e g
e E g e g e e
E t E t E t E t E t E t
E t E t E t
E t E t E t
κ κ γ γ
γ κ γ γ
Eγ κ γ γ
−
−
−
= + − + − + +
+ + − + +
+ + − + + ε+
V
 (6) 
 
 
1
1
1
*[ ] (1 | [ ] [ ] |)[(1 | [ ] [ ] |) exp( ) exp( )] [ ]
exp( )[(1 | [ ] [ ] |) exp( ) exp( )] [ ]
exp( )[(1 | [ ] [ ] |) exp( ) exp( )] [ ]
V g e V g e g e o
g V g e g e g
e V g e g e e
V t V t V t V t V t V t
V t V t V t
V t V t V t
κ κ δ δ
δ κ δ δ
δ κ δ δ
−
−
−
= + − + − + +
+ + − + +
+ + − + + ε+
 (7) 
 
where ( , ) (0, ).E V BVNε ε Σ∼  
 
 The six different parameters, Eκ , Vκ , gγ , eγ , gδ  and eδ  can each be estimated as a 
single scalar, analogous to the independently estimated equations in Table 3 with all 
restrictions imposed.  Instead, we have reparameterized each equation to incorporate the 
restrictions and then rendered each of the γ s and δ s a systematic varying parameter.  We 
employ as potential shifters for all of these four parameters (i.) some available 
sociodemographic variables (age, gender), as well as (ii.) subjective characteristics 
(informedness about environmental issues, degree of conservatism, likelihood of living in the 
same area in the future, and perceptions of researcher bias), and (iii.) dummy variables to 
  
  16
identify observations collected in the second and third subsamples.  Not all of these variables 
are statistically significant shifters of all four of the systematic varying parameters in this 
specification.  Persistently insignificant terms have therefore been dropped.    
 The model in Table 4 assumes cross-sectionally constant Viscusi-Magat ambiguity 
effects.  Each of the  and V  equations in the joint model is augmented with a single 
ambiguity parameter, κ
*[ ]E t *[ ]t
E and κV, respectively, that allows the weight placed on the individual's 
own priors to vary systematically with the absolute difference between the two external 
opinions.  These estimated ambiguity effect parameters are displayed as the first column in 
each triple of columns in Table 4.  Both of these coefficients are positive, as anticipated, and 
strongly statistically significant. The greater the disparities in the outside opinions about either 
of the moments of the future temperature distribution, the greater the weight placed on the 
respondents own priors.16   
 The other implications of the estimated model in Table 4 also seem plausible.  First, 
while it is not possible to distinguish an age effect from a cohort effect in an essentially cross-
sectional sample such as this, it nevertheless appears that older college students place less 
weight on environmental group opinions in deciding upon , and less weight on 
government scientists in deciding upon V .   
*[ ]E t
*[ ]t
 Gender is the only variable to have a statistically significant effect on all four 
weighting parameters.  In formulating both  and V , females in our sample place 
relatively more weight on the opinions of government scientists and environmental groups 
than do males.  In short, males appear to know what they know.  This stands in contrast to 
the results of Siegrist and Cvetkovich (2001), who find that female students had less trust in 
authorities concerning the random nature of cancer clusters and perceived a cancer cluster as 
*[ ]E t *[ ]t
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less likely to be a result of pure chance than did males.  There is, however, evidence of 
asymmetry about trust in authorities concerning good and bad news.  Perhaps females are 
more trusting of bad news in the form of climate change risks than they are of good news in 
the form of cancer clusters being purely random.17 
 Gender differences in risk perception have been identified by Finucane et al. (2000), 
who elaborate upon earlier findings by Flynn et al. (1994) that race and gender differences in 
risk perception in the US were primarily due to that 30% of the white male population who 
judge risks to be extremely low.  We have not focused in this paper on the determinants of 
initial risk perception (namely,  and V t ).  However, it is indeed the case that when the 
own-prior expectations, , are regressed linearly on the same characteristics that we used 
to explain attention to each outside authority, gender is the only variable with an individually 
statistically significant effect.  Females prior expected future average temperatures are higher 
by 0.44 degrees Fahrenheit than are those for males (at the 10% level).  V t  is also 
systematically higher for females than for males, by a statistically significant 0.6462 degrees-
squared.  (Conservatism, which decreases prior subjective future temperature variances, is the 
only other marginally significant factor.) 
[ ]oE t 0[ ]
[ ]oE t
0[ ]
 Returning to the results in Table 4, a greater subjective degree of informedness about 
environmental issues decreases the relative weight on government scientists in formulating 
.  It does not appear to have a significant effect upon any of the other weights.   *[ ]E t
 Students who identify themselves as being more conservative appear to place 
systematically more weight on government scientists opinions about  than do more-
liberal students, but less weight on government scientists opinions about V .  The more 
*[ ]E t
*[ ]t
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likely the student is to remain in the same region in the future, the more weight they tend to 
place on government scientists opinions in formulating their assessments of  (but not 
).  (As an alternative interpretation, the more likely it is that they will move to another 
region before the future time period stipulated in the survey, the less attention they pay to 
government opinions about  for their current region.) 
*[ ]E t
*[ ]V t
*[ ]E t
 Concerning researcher bias, the more the research team is perceived to be biased in 
favor of climate change mitigation programs, the less is the weight assigned to the ostensible 
government information sources in formulating an opinion about .  However, perceptions 
of researcher bias have no statistically discernible effects on the weights assigned to different 
information sources in formulating a revised subjective variance, V . 
*[ ]E t
*[ ]t
 The dummy variables for the second and third subsamples will be picking up all 
systematic differences between enrollees in the courses from which the observations are drawn 
and also any other differences in their full information sets.  The coefficients on these dummy 
variables could be capturing much more than just a simple year-to-year cohort effect. 
With these caveats, and compared to the first subsample, respondents in the second subsample 
appear to be less attentive to environmental groups opinions about .  In contrast, the 
third subsample appears to be less attentive to government scientists opinions.  Again, these 
differences may reflect many things, including different weather patterns during or prior to 
each sampling window.   
*[ ]E t
 
3.2. Three-equation Model with Heterogeneous Ambiguity Effects 
 The 95% range information directly elicited from respondents was converted into a 
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proxy for the anticipated variance in uncertain future temperatures (by imposing a strong 
assumption about symmetry) in order to test hypotheses about Bayesian-type behavior.  Since 
the Bayesian model appears to be dominated by more-general specifications, we now consider 
specifications wherein different updating processes are permitted for not only , but 
separately for the high guess and low guess updated predictions as well.  We will call 
these updated predictions  and . This leads to a three-equation analog to the system 
of equations in (6) and (7).  When the two new equations are used in lieu of the single 
variance equation, there are different sets of parameters in play.  
*[ ]E t
*[ ]H t *[ ]L t
Hκ  and Lκ  are now the 
Viscusi-Magat ambiguity parameters for the high-guess and low-guess equations.  For the 
high-guess equation, gλ  and eλ  will be the weighting parameters for the external information 
from government scientists and environmental groups, and gθ  and eθ  will be the 
corresponding weighting parameters for external low-guess values.  The revised system of 
equation is: 
 
* 1
1
1
[ ] (1 | [ ] [ ] |)[(1 | [ ] [ ] |) exp( ) exp( )] [ ]
exp( )[(1 | [ ] [ ] |) exp( ) exp( )] [ ]
exp( )[(1 | [ ] [ ] |) exp( ) exp( )] [ ]
E g e E g e g e o
g E g e g e g
e E g e g e e
E t E t E t E t E t E t
E t E t E t
E t E t E t
κ κ γ γ
γ κ γ γ
Eγ κ γ γ
−
−
−
= + − + − + +
+ + − + +
+ + − + + ε+
H
 (8) 
 
 
* 1
1
1
[ ] (1 | [ ] [ ] |)[(1 | [ ] [ ] |) exp( ) exp( )] [ ]
exp( )[(1 | [ ] [ ] |) exp( ) exp( )] [ ]
exp( )[(1 | [ ] [ ] |) exp( ) exp( )] [ ]
H g e H g e g e o
g H g e g e g
e H g e g e e
H t H t H t H t H t H t
H t H t H t
H t H t H t
κ κ λ λ
λ κ λ λ
λ κ λ λ
−
−
−
= + − + − + +
+ + − + +
+ + − + + ε+
L
 (9) 
 
* 1
1
1
[ ] (1 | [ ] [ ] |)[(1 | [ ] [ ] |) exp( ) exp( )] [ ]
exp( )[(1 | [ ] [ ] |) exp( ) exp( )] [ ]
exp( )[(1 | [ ] [ ] |) exp( ) exp( )] [ ]
L g e L g e g e o
g L g e g e g
e L g e g e e
L t L t L t L t L t L t
L t L t L t
L t L t L t
κ κ θ θ
θ κ θ θ
θ κ θ θ
−
−
−
= + − + − + +
+ + − + +
+ + − + + ε+
 (10) 
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where ( , , ) (0, )E H L MVNε ε ε Σ∼ . 
 
The NLLS estimates for systematically varying versions of the parameters in this 
system are presented in Table 5.  Note that in addition to replacing the variance equation by 
separate equations for the high guess and low guess about future temperatures, we 
generalize the model by allowing all three ambiguity parameters, Eκ , Hκ  and , not just the 
weighting parameters, to vary with measured respondent attributes.  This appears to be the first 
empirical attempt to identify heterogeneity in the degree of ambiguity aversion across subjects. 
 For , for the base category of environmentally uninformed males, ambiguity in outside 
information increases reliance on own prior opinions.  This effect is significantly larger for 
females, but for more informed individuals, the ambiguity effects shrink. 
Lκ
*[ ]E t
 For the E  equation, as we move from the two-equation model to the three-equation 
model, there are some adjustments to the set of variables which have statistically significant 
effects on respondents best guess about future temperatures. However, coefficients that are 
significant in both specifications retain the same signs.   
*[ ]t
The weight placed on the opinions of government scientists about expected future 
mean temperatures is no longer significantly affected by the respondents degree of 
conservatism in the three-equation model, and the effect of his or her perception of researcher 
bias in favor of climate change mitigation programs becomes insignificant as well.  But other 
variables that did not make individually statistically significant contributions to the weights in 
the two-equation model now figure significantly in the three-equation model. Greater age (in 
my 17- to 23-year-old sample) now decreases reliance on government scientists opinions in 
forming expectations about future climate.  The second subsample (SMPL2) is also 
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statistically significantly different in terms of the weights it appears to place, on average, on 
the opinions of government scientists.  In the original two-equation model, degree of 
subjective informedness about environmental issues was not a significant determinant of the 
weight placed on the opinions of environmental groups.  In the three-equation model, greater 
subjective informedness significantly reduces the attention paid to environmental groups.18 
 For H , the intercept in the ambiguity aversion term is statistically significantly 
negative.  However, for the age levels represented in this sample, the fitted value of the 
ambiguity aversion term will be positive.  It will also decrease with the respondents degree of 
conservatism. 
*[ ]t
 Not surprisingly, the variables that affected the weights on government scientists and 
environmental groups opinions about variance also affect the weights on these same 
opinions about the high guess.  Some additional weight coefficients become significant, 
however, when the information about high and low guesses is not combined into an estimate 
of variance.  Greater informedness now reduces reliance on government scientists opinions in 
forming a revised opinion about the likely upper bound on average temperatures.  The greater 
his or her perceived bias of the research team in favor of climate change mitigation programs, 
the less weight the respondent places on the ostensible opinions of government scientists.  
Greater conservatism reduces reliance not only on government scientists opinions about the 
upper bound, but also on environmental groups opinions about this upper bound.  The second 
subsample places significantly less weight on both government scientists and environmental 
groups opinions than the rest of the sample. 
 There is rather less statistically significant heterogeneity in the weighting process that 
yields respondents revised opinions about the lower bound of the range for future average 
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temperatures in this region.  However, the design of the outside opinions about the lower 
bound exhibits much less variability than the design for the means and the upper bounds (see 
Table 1), so perhaps this lesser measured sensitivity is not surprising.   
 For the lower bound equation, greater disparity between the outside sources actually 
seems to decrease reliance on ones own priors in formulating opinions, at least for females.  
Older respondents place less weight on government scientists opinions, but females place 
more weight on these opinions.  Neither age nor gender has a statistically significant effect on 
the weight placed on environmental groups opinions, but greater informedness about 
environmental issues or greater conservatism both reduce reliance on the opinions of 
environmental groups about the lower bound, which is unsurprising.  Both the second and 
third subsamples display a lower average weight on the opinions of environmental groups 
about the lower bound on future local average temperatures. 
  
3.3.   Other potential specifications 
 Hoehn and Randall (2002) reiterate the findings of Viscusi and OConnor (1984) and 
Viscusi (1989) showing, in a Bayesian model, that new information has an effect if it differs 
from subjects prior knowledge.  We have explored a more-general specification wherein the 
vector of individual attributes used to shift the weights placed on the opinions of government 
scientists and environmental groups in each of equations (8)- (10) is augmented by a measure 
of the difference between the respondents own prior and the corresponding opinion of each 
source.  For example, the systematically varying weighting parameter on government 
scientists opinions about future annual average temperatures gains a term in [ ] [ ]g oE t E t−  and 
the weight on environmental groups gains a term in [ ] [ ]eE t E t o− .  Unfortunately, if we retain 
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the terms for ambiguity effects in the model, which involve the differences between the two 
outside information sources opinions, the nonlinear optimization process cannot be induced to 
converge.  This is undoubtedly due to there being too much collinearity between the external 
information ambiguity term, [ ] [ ]g eE t E t− , and the two difference-from-own-prior terms, 
[ ] [ ]g oE t E t−  and . [ ] [E t E t− ]e o
 
4.  Conclusions 
 The limited size of the convenience sample used for the empirical portion of this study 
(n = 608), means that the findings from the analysis of this survey are not conclusive.  They 
are, however, provocative.  The issue of how individuals process the disparate information 
they receive concerning risks for which the underlying science is uncertain has not been 
addressed in any such detail before.  The process is likely to be similar across different risks, 
even though we have in this paper worked with an empirical example concerning climate 
change risks.   
 What has been learned about the evolution of public opinion in the face of new 
information by examining the nature of one such process at an individual level?.  
1. People do not appear to be strict Bayesians, although they do seem to achieve their 
updated opinions by using weighted averages of their own prior opinions and whatever 
outside information becomes available.  The nature of these weights, however, varies 
across individuals. 
2. There is no evidence of alarmist learning, at least on average, in this sample of 608 
survey participant drawn from a college population.  This does not preclude occasional 
instances of alarmist learning on the part of particular individuals, but any such 
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behavior is too rare to appear in these data. 
3. There can be substantial and significant ambiguity effects.  Disagreement among 
external information sources decreases the amount of attention paid to them by 
individuals as they update their priors and the extent of this effect varies significantly 
across the population.  For some stakeholder groups, this insight can help target 
campaigns of obfuscation to the constituencies that are most vulnerable.   
  For researchers designing the information matter to present to respondents in 
stated preferences studies, the lesson is that it can matter greatly whether this 
information is characterized as controversial or consensus opinion, and to different 
extents for different subpopulations.  The usual goal of such studies is to value a 
common objective risk for all respondents.  Prior subjective risks are rarely elicited, 
and the risk assumptions that motivate peoples policy choices are presumed to 
coincide exactly with the information matter provided in the survey instrument.  This 
coincidence is unlikely ever to be perfectly achieved, but it seems clear that the match 
will be closest if the information matter can be portrayed as a broad scientific 
consensus. 
4. The source of information can have an effect on subjective risk that will vary across 
types of respondents.   
a. First, my limited sample of 17- to 23-year-old college students does not allow 
us to get a complete picture of the age profile of susceptibility to outside 
information sources in formulating opinions about climate change.  However, 
the fact that there are statistically significant disparities in the opinion-updating 
process by age, even within this very narrow age range, suggests that there may 
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be important age effects in the general population as well.  In any strategy to 
manipulate public support for mitigation programs via the provision of 
information, the sources and targeting of information by age group is likely to 
be important. 
b. Second, my results suggest that women (at least young women) may be far 
more susceptible to the prognostications of perceived experts than are (young) 
men.  Gender-targeted information campaigns may have a more cost-effective 
impact on public support for climate change mitigation policies than generic 
campaigns.  Furthermore, gender appears to have a similar effect on the amount 
of attention paid to both types of outside information sources in this study.   
  However, the greater the disparity between the competing outside 
information sources (i.e. the informational ambiguity), the greater the weight 
that everyone in my sample tends to place on their own prior opinions, at least 
with respect to mean predictions about climate change.  Per degree Fahrenheit 
of disparity between the two outside information sources, the tendency to 
adhere to ones own prior opinions about mean climate change is 80% greater 
for women than for men.  Thus, to have the maximum effect on the audience, 
(and especially on women) any information campaign should be consistent 
across authorities. 
c. Third, campaigns to increase individuals perceptions of themselves as being 
well-informed about environmental issues will induce them to pay less attention 
both to government scientists and to environmental groups, and to rely instead 
on their own opinions about climate change prospects.  Provided these own 
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opinions are valid (i.e. provided individuals actually are better informed about 
environmental issues), this decrease in attention paid to the opinions of outside 
expert sources when new information is provided may be effectively offset. 
d. An increased degree of conservatism, as may accompany different political 
regimes, may decrease the attention paid to both government scientists and 
environmental groups opinions about the upper bounds on possible climate 
change.  Thus, information campaigns to raise awareness about climate change 
prospects will be less successful in a more conservative political climate.   
  However, greater conservatism will also tend to reduce the extent to 
which disparities in these outside information sources lead the individual to 
revert to their own priors in formulating a revised subjective estimate of the 
upper bound on mean temperature changes. This tendency may lead 
environmental groups, for example, to become more strident in their calls for 
climate mitigation policy during conservative regimes, partly by exaggerating 
the likely climate prospects and consequences in the absence of mitigation.  
Less attention would be paid to them otherwise, and the loss of attention from 
being out of line with government scientists predictions is diminished 
compared to what it would be in a more liberal political environment. 
 The models explored in this paper were developed because it is clear from other work 
(Cameron, 2002) that individuals subjective perceptions of climate change risks at the point 
of making a policy choice figure strongly in their willingness to pay for climate change 
mitigation programs.  Rather than taking these risk perceptions as exogenously given, we 
allow in this analysis for the fact that they can be manipulated by available information and we 
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uncover a surprising degree of statistically significant heterogeneity in the way individuals 
appear to process risk information under conditions of uncertainty.  With a larger and more 
representative sample from the general population, richer models could almost certainly be 
supported. The robustness of these findings across other types of risks should also be 
evaluated.  
 For the climate change problem, willingness to pay for climate change mitigation 
programs constitutes willingness to pay for a substantial public good, and there are few 
indirect markets that can allow us to infer the needed demand information from revealed 
preferences. Consequently, stated preference techniques are likely to prove essential to any 
attempts at comprehensive valuation of climate change mitigation benefits and the benefits 
from reducing other poorly understood risks.  Any stated preference exercise must be shown to 
pass a scope test, wherein willingness to pay for the good varies directly with the amount of 
the good at stake (Arrow et al. 1993).  The amount of the good at stakerisk reducedin 
many of these cases is subjective and highly uncertain for most consumers.  Thus, an 
understanding of subjective distributions for these risksboth in terms of expectation and the 
degree of uncertaintyand how these subjective distributions can be influenced, either 
naturally or strategically, will be critical to the public decision-making process for many 
challenging public policy problems.  This study contributes to such an understanding. 
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                                                                         Table 1 
                                      Descriptive Statistics for Complete Estimating Sample (n = 608) 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 VARIABLE DESCRIPTION     MEAN STD. DEV 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Distributions of future annual mean temperature: (degrees Fahrenheit) 
 
  Prior subjective mean temp.                    66.58 2.81 [ ]ownE t
 [ ]govE t  "Government Scientists" mean temp. 66.03 0.50 
  "Environmental Groups" mean temp. 68.15  1.49 [ ]envE t
  Posterior subjective mean temp. 66.74   1.88 *[ ]E t
 
  Prior subjective temp. variance 2.71  3.78 [ ]ownV t
 [ ]govV t  "Government Scientists" temp.  variance 1.12 0.82 
  "Environmental Groups" temp. variance 4.12  3.44 [ ]envV t
  Posterior subjective temp. variance 2.23  2.30 *[ ]V t
 
  Prior subjective high guess for temp.                   69.43 3.81 [ ]ownH t
 [ ]govH t  "Government Scientists" high guess for temp. 67.90 1.09 
  "Environmental Groups" high guess for temp. 71.37  2.92 [ ]envH t
  Posterior subjective high guess for temp. 69.60  2.61 *[ ]H t
 
  Prior subjective low guess for temp.                    63.83 2.70 [ ]ownL t
 [ ]govL t  "Government Scientists" low guess for temp. 64.16 0.65 
  "Environmental Groups" low guess for temp. 64.56  1.22 [ ]envL t
  Posterior subjective low guess for temp. 64.18   1.73 *[ ]L t
 
Respondent Attributes: 
 
 AGE Age of respondent  (17- to 23-year-old sample)                             19.39   1.32 
 FEMALE Gender (0=male, 1=female) 0.5065   
 INFORM I consider myself well-informed about environmental               4.072    1.24   
  Issues (1 =strongly disagree , 7 =strongly agree ) 
 CONSRV I consider myself to be   3.952    1.22   
  (1 = extremely liberal, 7 = extremely conservative) 
 IMMOBILE Fifteen to twenty years from now, I expect to live in the  4.295    1.72   
  Same region as I do now. 
   (1 = strongly disagree,7 = strongly agree) 
 RES. BIAS I suspect that the [team] conducting this study believes     5.267    1.13  
  that preventing climate change is  
        (1 = extremely unnecessary , 7 =extremely urgent ) 
  SMPL2 Membership in Fall 1997 subsample 0.3898 
   SMPL3  Membership in Fall 1998 subsample 0.4967 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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                                   Table 2:   Test of Bayesian Updating in Formulation of  
                   Posterior Subjective Distribution of Future Annual Average Temperatures  (n = 608) 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 VARIABLEa : best guess *[ ]E t *[ ]V t 1− : precision 
  _________________________ _________________________ 
 
 constant -8.088 -  -0.2131  - 
  (-1.828)  (-1.48)     
                                                                                                                                                                          
 own-term 1.126 1.002 0.6696 0.6632 
  (16.69)** (320.6)** (32.11)** (32.47)** 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 gov-term 1.142 1.020 0.09493 0.04400 
  (17.07)** (442.5)** (1.85)* (1.15) 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 env-term 1.110 0.9894 0.1668 0.07951 
  (16.79)** (228.8)** (1.54) (0.87) 
                                                                                                                                                       
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
H0:  Bayesian? 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
(F-test P-value) 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a  Let  .  Then the own-term, gov-term, and env-term variables 
correspond to the first, second, and third constructed variables in each of the two equations: 
1 1( [ ] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ ] )o gD V t V t V t
− −= + + 1e
−
 
 
11 1
0 1 2 3
( [ ] ) [ ]( [ ] ) [ ] ( [ ] ) [ ]*[ ] g go o e e E
V t E tV t E t V t E tE t
D D D
α α α α
−− −
ε= + + + +  
 
 1 1 10 1 2 3*[ ] ( [ ] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ ] )o g eV t V t V t V t
1
Pβ β β β ε
− − −= + + + +−  
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                                      Table 3:   Simple Linear Models for the Formulation of  
                   Posterior Subjective Distribution of Future Annual Average Temperatures  (n = 608) 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 VARIABLEa : best guess : variance *[ ]E t *[ ]V t
  _________________________ _________________________ 
 
 constant    -20.58  -  0.08122  - 
  (-2.67)**  (0.54)     
                                                                                                                                                                            
 own-term    0.4357       0.4258       0.2986       0.3021  
  (22.63)**   (22.43)**      (15.76)**    (17.06)** 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 gov-term    0.5570       0.2877       0.2593      0.2899  
  (5.15)**   (7.33)**     (2.80)**    (3.99)** 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 env-term    0.3168       0.2854      0.2987       0.3049 
  (8.80)**   (8.34)**  (13.73)**    (16.62)**   
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Test:     & '0 0α =
' ' '
1 2 3 1α α α+ + =  
'
0 0β =  &  β β  
' ' '
1 2 3 1β+ + =
  α α   ' ' '1 2 3 1α+ + =
' ' '
1 2 3 1β β β+ + =  
 
H0:  P-values  0.0196 0.377 0.208 0.090 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
a  The own-term, gov-term, and env-term variables correspond to the first, second, and third variables in 
the following specifications: 
    
      ' ' ' '0 1 2 3*[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]o g eE t E t E t E t
'
Eα α α α= + + + +ε
'
V
       
    
        V * ' ' ' '0 1 2 3[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]o g et V t V t V tβ β β β= + + + +ε  
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Table 4 
Two-Equation Simultaneous Nonlinear Least Squares Model  
with Homogeneous Ambiguity Effects.  and V  each a Weighted Average of  *[ ]E t *[ ]t
Own, Government, and Environmental Group Analogs (n = 608; Maximized Log L = -2096.567) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
VARIABLE  :  best guess*[ ]E t  a :  variance*[ ]V t  a 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
  Eκ  gγ  eγ  Vκ  gδ  eδ  
  ___________________________ ___________________________ 
  
 constant 0.2667  1.708   3.682    0.9718 8.537   0.7414  
  (2.75)** (2.15)** (3.34)**   (3.10)** (3.66)**  (2.95)** 
      
 AGE - - -0.1975 - -0.4053  -  
    (-3.52) **  (-3.78)**  
       
 FEMALE -  0.6327   0.7812 - 1.678  0.8221  
   (2.54)** (4.14)**  (5.26)** (5.25)** 
       
 INFORM - -0.4007 - - - - 
    (-3.16)**      
      
 CONSRV - 0.2035  -  -  -0.1976   - 
      (1.83)*   (-1.74)*  
      
 IMMOBILE -  0.1930  - - - - 
   (2.51)**       
      
 RES.BIAS -  -0.3394   -  -  -  - 
   (-3.25)**        
      
 SMPL2 - - -0.6324 - -   - 
    (-2.81)**     
 
 SMPL3 - -1.055 - - - - 
   (-3.52)**  
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a These estimates correspond to the specification detailed in equations (6) and  (7).  In these specifications, the 
ambiguity effects parameters,  and Eκ Vκ  are simple scalars, but each of the four weight-related  
parameters,  gγ ,  eγ , gδ  and eδ   is systematically varying.   
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Appendix 
 
 
Randomized Design Characteristics of the Outside Information Sets Presented to Respondents 
 
 
Note that the historical annual average local temperature = 63.5 degrees Fahrenheit. 
 
 
A.  Most likely future annual average temperature locally (Fahrenheit degrees) 
 
                                                     Environmental Groups 
 
      66.5  69.5 Total 
                                 ------------------------------------------------------------ 
Govt      65.5   |   146         141         287  
  Scientists     66.5   |     165         156         321  
                                 ----------------------------------------------------------- 
      Total   |     311         297         608  
 
 
B.  Lower bound on likely range of future annual average temperature locally (Fahrenheit degrees) 
 
                                                            Environmental Groups 
                                 
              63.5          65        66.5       Total 
                                ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       63.5   |     146          76          68         290  
Govt       64.5   |        85          35          34         154  
Scientists         65   |      86          42          36         164  
                                ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      Total   |     317         153         138         608  
 
 
C.  Upper bound on likely range of future annual average temperature locally (Fahrenheit degrees) 
 
                                                                       Environmental Groups 
 
       68        69.5        72.5        75.5       Total 
                                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       66.5   |       35          43          34          42         154  
Govt      67.5   |     35          33          28          37         133  
 Scientists         68   |     42          46          36          40         164  
       69.5   |     41          36          40          40         157  
                               ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Total   |    153         158         138         159         608  
 
 
 
Remark:  After the survey, each participant group received an extensive lecture-long classroom debriefing about the purpose of 
the survey, its experimental design, and plans for the analysis of the survey data.  Drawn specifically to their attention was the 
fact that these outside information sources were varied across respondents, and were (in some cases) somewhat extreme 
representations of the opinions of these unspecified authorities. 
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NOTES 
 
* As this project has evolved, it has benefited from comments received at presentations at the 
CERE/NOAA Conference on Research Transformations in Environmental Economics:  Policy Design in 
Response to Global Change at Duke University (May 5-6, 1997) and at the EML/NSF Symposium on 
Preference Elicitation at UC Berkeley (July, 1997), the World Congress of Environmental and Resource 
Economists, Venice, Italy (June, 1998), and the Canadian Resource and Environmental Economics 
meeting, Guelph, Ontario, Canada (October, 2000).  Data collection was facilitated by Kathleen McGarry, 
Fred Luk, Michael Sproul, Ed McDevitt, and Pari Kasliwal.  Thanks are due to Vic Adamowicz, Anna 
Alberini, Ryan Bosworth, Graham Crawford, JR DeShazo, Barri Grossman, Jack Hirshleifer, Kathleen 
McGarry, and  V. Kerry Smith for helpful comments, to Sara Wong Chang for careful data entry, and to 
Casey Williams for assistance in assembling the survey instruments.  Any remaining errors are my own. 
 
1
 For example, cigarette packages display a rotating set of warnings from the Surgeon General. 
Megans Law provides information on the whereabouts of registered sex offenders. Californias 
Proposition 65 mandates that businesses disclose hazardous substances used on their premises, 
and the EPAs Toxic Release Inventory makes the presence of pollution and its sources know to 
the community.  Adler and Pittle (1984) address the issue of information provision as a substitute 
for regulation. 
 
2
 Tobacco companies sponsor research about the risks of tobacco use and publicize the results.  
Civic leaders in communities with high rates of pollution or crime launch appealing public 
relations campaigns to recruit or retain businesses. 
 
 
  
3  In economics, the topics of (i.) individuals' risk perceptions, (ii.) how these risk perceptions 
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respond to information, and (iii.) the value of risk changes, have been fertile areas for research.  
Some representative studies include Smith and Desvousges (1987, 1988), Smith and Johnson 
(1988), Viscusi (1985a, 1985b), Viscusi and Magat (1987, 1992), Viscusi et al. (1986), and 
Viscusi and O'Connor (1984). .  In the context of health risk assessment, Johnson and Slovic 
(1995) look at the problem of conveying uncertainties and the consequences for risk perception 
and trust.  Sjoberg (2001) reports that trust and risk perception bear only a weak relationship 
because people believe that there are limits to what even experts can know. In almost all these 
cases, the risks under consideration are physical health or workplace risks.  But "risk" can of 
course be defined more broadly to include preferences over uncertain outcomes more generally. 
 
 4 The question of climate change mitigation falls into the class of policy problems involving the 
regulation of risk.  The work of Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1985) is relevant. 
 
5  For more general and comprehensive treatments of the topic of risk perception, see Sjoberg, 
(2000), or Slovic  (2000).   
 
6  For example, the issue of long-term environmental risks is addressed in Fischhoff (1990). 
 
7  Benson, Curley and Smith (1995) address the role of belief assessment in the process of 
eliciting probabilities.  Williams and Hammitt (2001) elicit subjective risk perceptions for 
conventional and organic produce. 
 
8  Research currently in progress, employing an online survey, allows respondents to choose 
whether to view information from each source, on each of a variety of climate change topics, and 
to choose how much time to spend studying this information. In that case, exposure to 
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information is endogenous, so the models for updating subjective probabilities concerning 
climate change will be much more complex. 
 
9  See also Heath and Tversky (1991). 
 
10 Viscusi and Magat's (1992) scenario is different in that they do not observe the individual's 
prior probability.  They append a quadratic term in R  to their empirical model for a discrete 
prior probability, and this term can pick up any systematic shift in the implied prior probability 
due to the extent of the ambiguity in the external information.   
 
11 The larger project involves an online survey of students at many different institutions in 
conjunction with a general population mail survey, and  is currently funded by the National 
Science Foundation (SBR 98-18875, 4/99-12/02). 
 
12  The first subsample (summer session 1997) employed no incentives and yielded a rather low 
response rate, as expected.  The second subsample (Fall 1997) and third subsample (Fall 1998) 
were collected in the authors own Principles of Economics classes and Applied Regression 
Analysis classes.  In these courses, the survey was integrated into the instruction in segments 
concerning the non-market valuation of public goods and the application of nonlinear simultaneous 
equations and probit models.  Nominal extra credit was attached to submitting an anonymous 
survey and a detached receipt with the students name and section number.  This protocol was 
designed to preserve anonymity yet reward participation. The number of surveys collected was 
only slightly smaller than the number of receipts turned in, and only a handful of submitted survey 
instruments were turned in blank.  Given the exploratory nature of the sample, we obviously did 
not (and could not) pursue non-response conversion.   
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13 The external information was protected during the elicitation of priors by sealing the 
centerfold of the survey instrument and announcing on the cover of the survey instrument 
IMPORTANT:  Do not break the seal on the center pages (or peek!) until you have finished 
Section B.  Previewing this information may contaminate your answers to Section B.  In the 
subsequent online version of the survey, this type of prohibition can be enforced.  For the paper-
and-pencil version reported upon here, we must trust that most participants complied with this 
request. 
 
14 This information constitutes one component of the experimental design of the survey.  All 
stylized forecasts fall within the range of assorted actual forecasts.  Concerning survey research 
ethics, there is the delicate matter of not lying to respondents.  Since we are purposefully vague 
about precisely which "government scientists" and "environmental groups" have made these 
forecasts, there may be some natural attenuation of the credibility assigned by respondents to these 
opinions.  Respondents were debriefed thoroughly after the survey was collected. 
 
15  Research on the issue of whether individuals might be Bayesian decision-makers includes 
Viscusi (1985b), Viscusi and Magat (1992), Viscusi and O'Connor (1984), and Fischhoff and 
Beyth-Marom (1983). 
 
16 Quadratic terms in the disparity between the two outside information sources were not 
statistically significant in either equation in the systematically varying parameters model. 
 
17 Cvetkovich et al. (2002) focus on general trust in the nuclear power industry and the food 
supply industry. They find that individuals low in general trust judged bad news as more 
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informative than good news. 
 
18 This effect is observationally equivalent to the respondents rejection of the surveys statement 
of environmental groups opinions.  Less attention may be paid to outside opinions if the 
surveys assertions are less credible to these respondents. 
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